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Dubois is exonerated from the old charge of pandering to the vices of the Regent in his youth. The view is again and effectively attacked that Charles XII. had any intention of invading England in 1717; the whole scheme was a device of Goertz to extort money from the Jacobites. Also Alberoni is pictured in a less aggressive light than commonly. There are many exquisite pen-portraits, and the devices by which Dubois sought to secure his ascendancy in English society are piquantly described. A few slips are to be noted. John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair, appears (p. 34) as Lord John Dalrymple Stair; Hamptoncourt (p. 246) is unusual, and one wonders what can be meant by "St. Martin Scort" (p. 251). The Prince of Wales was not named "Regent" on the king's journey to Hanover in 1716 (p. 137) but "Guardian of the Realm and Lieutenant", an office unknown since the days of the Black Prince. Stanhope became (p. 173) Chancellor of the Exchequer as well as First Lord of the Treasury in 1717. There was no "Duke" of Dorset till 1720 (p. 83), and the reviewer knows of no "Duchess of Sandwich" (p. 243). It is hardly just to say (p. 62) that the Jacobites were shot *en masse* after the Rising of 1715.

ARTHUR LYON CROSS.

British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765. By GEORGE LOUIS BEER. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1907. Pp. x, 327.)

FROM all the preceding books upon his subject and period, Mr. Beer's *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765*, differs radically in respect either of its method or of its point of view. From most of its predecessors it differs in both respects. And its differences, with scarcely an exception, are to Mr. Beer's credit and to his reader's profit. The point of view is that of English officialdom, of the men who, in administrative office, and sometimes in legislative position, felt themselves responsible for the conduct and control of the empire over seas. The method is a patient and systematic examination, volume by volume, and page by page, of the traces which their activities have scattered through the files of the London Record Office. This is a work which needed to be done. And it needed to be done as Mr. Beer has done it, in a spirit of sympathetic appreciation for their difficulties, but not of blind acquiescence in their conclusions.

The book falls into two nearly equal parts. The first (chapters I.-VII.) is concerned with the test imposed upon Britain's traditional colonial policy by the experiences of the Seven Years' War; the second with the efforts of the colonial administrators to reshape that policy in the light of their recent experiences. Mr. Beer first shows that, in return for a colonial obedience more or less complete, Great Britain had long afforded the American colonies constant naval protection at her own cost, and had even spent large sums upon frontier garrisons and Indian presents. But for the rest she still expected the colonists

to assume the chief burden of their own local defense in time of European peace; and this, in fact, they had measurably done. The approach of war, however, put a new face upon the problem of colonial defense, and after the failure of the Albany Congress (chapter II.) and the refusal of the colonies not merely to assist one another, but even to provide adequately for themselves, colonial administrators on both sides of the Atlantic were for a few months prolific in plans for meeting the cost of imperial defense by Parliamentary taxation (chapter III.). These were, to be sure, temporarily laid aside for political reasons, but they were not forgotten. And when peace arrived the fiscal problem had been cleared by the complete breakdown of the requisition system—admirably traced in chapter IV.—and the need of Parliamentary taxation had been demonstrated to the entire satisfaction of the official mind. Meanwhile another factor had appeared, destined to exert a great and perhaps a decisive influence upon the course of colonial reforms after the war. This was “an illegal and most pernicious Trade, carried on by the King’s Subjects, in North America, and the West Indies, as well to the French Islands, as to the French Settlements”, whereby, as Pitt believed, France was “principally, if not alone, enabled to sustain, and protract, this long and expensive War” (p. 105). In the only adequate treatment of this subject ever published, Mr. Beer shows in detail and beyond question (chapters V.–VII.) that this treasonable trade gained vast dimensions in spite of numerous prohibitions by colonial authority, and of the determined efforts of the home government to suppress it by the use of courts of admiralty and writs of assistance on shore, and of many vessels of the royal navy at sea.

The second part of the book, which traces the reshaping of colonial policy in the light of war experiences, is introduced by an interesting chapter (VIII.) on the pamphlet controversy whether England should retain Canada or the French West Indies. Herein Mr. Beer finds “a change in the economic theory of colonization”, from the ideal of a colony which “produced commodities that the mother country would otherwise have to buy from foreigners” to “the more modern view that colonies should primarily furnish a market for the mother country’s manufactures” (pp. 134–136, *passim*). He realizes, to be sure, that both ideas had long prevailed, as indeed was almost inevitable, since each is complementary to the other; but his desire to find in this change of theory a clear and striking explanation for the ensuing changes in the colonial system has perhaps led him to exaggerate its importance, or, at least, its abruptness. Certainly the tenth chapter, which explains in detail the changes made in the enumerated commodities and the bounty system in 1763–1765, seems quite to justify the conclusion (p. 226) that the aim of these “purely commercial regulations” was “to encourage and not to restrict colonial industry”, while, similarly, the

eleventh chapter, dealing with the causes that produced 4 Geo. III., c. 15, seems to show beyond doubt that "experiences during the war", and not a change of economic theory, formed their basis (p. 228). In the revenue acts of 1764 and 1765, which are the subject of chapter XIII., Mr. Beer returns to the fiscal motive with which he began, and the concluding chapter, on colonial opposition, well brings out the fiscal character of the Sugar Act of 1764, and its effect in preparing New England to resist the more famous Stamp Act of the following year.

Of the book as a whole its author justly says that its focus of interest is the British Empire, and not the rise of the American nation; that it is on its positive side a portrayal of British policy, and only on its negative side an account of the preliminaries of the American Revolution, and hence, if viewed as a study in American history, it is incomplete. Nonetheless it constitutes, in the reviewer's opinion, the most substantial contribution to an understanding of the causes of the American Revolution that has appeared since Mellen Chamberlain wrote his chapter for the sixth volume of Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History*, twenty years ago; while upon its own direct subject it is not only unrivalled but unapproached by any one.

Passing to more detailed criticisms, it is obviously a matter of taste whether one shall agree with Mr. Beer that the Molasses Act of 1733 "was not an integral part of the colonial system proper" (p. 291). It was, indeed, at strife with the purpose of making a market in New England for British woolens; but in that circumstance it is possible to see not an aberrancy from the colonial system proper, but only an exceptionally clear manifestation of that internal conflict of interests by which the colonial system proper was rent at last. It is also to be regretted that Mr. Beer has not increased the usefulness of his very full notes by making references to the *New York Colonial Documents* and similar works, when, as often happens, they contain papers used by him, but concealed from common knowledge under citations like "B. T. N. Y. 34 Mn8". These are, however, small matters, whose enumeration can but serve to emphasize the general impeccability of the work.

C. H. H.

Reformversuche und Sturz des Absolutismus in Frankreich (1774-1788). Von HANS GLAGAU, ao. Professor a. d. Universität Marburg. (München und Berlin. R. Oldenbourg. 1908. Pp. viii, 396.)

"In its origin, the revolution was no movement in favor of political liberty, but rather an agitation in behalf of reform and order", and among the leaders in this early period, "undoubtedly the Physiocrats played the most important role. It was they who enticed the monarchy